Republic of MacedoniaEver since the day of its foundation, June 17, 1990, until today, the party not once accepted to be classified as a "right-wing" one, but obviously silently agreed with it, having focused on fighting against the parties of the so-called "left- wing". The times in which it was founded seemed to be on this party's side. The old system was dispersing and there was no clear vision of what the new one should be like. Thus, VMRO- DPMNE, with its ideological and political resolve to make the most of those times in achieving, as they claimed even back then, the essential interest of Macedonia -- its state sovereignty and complete independence, met with widest response among the citizens, which was "materialised" during the first free elections in 38 Parliament seats for this party.
The party membership, and especially its top-leaders, quickly created an image of a political party saying freely and fearlessly what is on its mind, determined to choose no means in realising its intention of "demystifying the last 45 years", describing them as a darkest period in Macedonia's existence. The party President Ljupco Georgievski, in his interview for the party paper "Glas" ("Voice") on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of VMRO, confirmed, i.e., determined the most significant tasks of the party: defining of the republic of Macedonia's international position and liberating from the blockade imposed by the country's southern and northern neighbours; final dealing away with dangerous pro-Yugoslav streams in Macedonia, as well as with communism, which, according to the party, was taking roots in Macedonia; defining the status of and relations with the Albanian minority; and, finally, consolidating the country's economy. This is exactly why many have tried to describe the entire activities of VMRO- DPMNE as "anti-communism". And with many arguments for this. In fact, it is enough to read at the party's Program, which remained literally unchanged ever since it was written (which can be hardly said of any other party), to be assured in this. As much as party opponents are inclined to interpret this as VMRO-DPMNE's weak point and attitudes not able to evolve with the changing times, the party itself considers this to be one of its greatest qualities, explaining it with its stability. The main program goal of VMRO-DPMNE is the struggle to re- establish pride and dignity of the Macedonian people and state. This "Macedonianism" is quite present in all other program goals, which resulted in its attribute of "most-Macedonian party". The noticeable scornful note in this did not seem to introduce insecurity in the party in its orientation. On the contrary, it just seemed to be further motivation for the party to even stronger defending of its aims.
Among other things, the program also includes an insistence on Macedonia's confederate status. Asked about this point, still not removed from the program, the party leaders and members say it had been the only guarantee for the country's complete sovereignty and a basic condition in negotiating with all neighbouring countries on uniting of Macedonia. And, here is where it all starts. What exactly does "uniting of Macedonia" mean? The program states "complete spiritual, political, economic and ethnic uniting of the partitioned Macedonian people and a state in the future United Balkans"! This was one of the things causing political tempers to stir, whenever this party was discussed. And even more so, because of the fact that the proclamation of the party's foundation says VMRO-DPMNE will struggle to achieve national and territorial uniting in an independent national state -- a statement little likely to leave any one indifferent. Even a layman interpretation of this leads to a conclusion the party neither acknowledges nor accepts the present Macedonian borders. The attacks on the party in regard to this were so fierce, that the party leaders were later on forced to explain they had meant it in a different way, but, on purpose or on accident, they somehow failed to support this explanation with firm arguments.
What can simply not be avoided when analysing this party even on the surface is its everlasting subject -- President Gligorov, i.e., his open dossier actively led by the party, from its own perspective. In fact, this started following the moment Georgievski resigned from the position of the President's vice-president. He then informed the public his position had been a farce, as crucial duties were not divided among himself and the president. Ever since then, the country's both foreign and domestic policies are very frequently criticised. Practically, no move by the president has been evaluated as positive.
As for the party's attitude towards the minorities living in Macedonia, it consists of not much philosophy. The election campaign program states only one sentence on this issue -- the future Macedonian state will guarantee basic civil and human rights to all minorities in it, in accordance with internationally set standards. This was the party's view even when the constitution was being adopted. VMRO-DPMNE proposed several amendments disagreeing with parts of the constitution, especially demanding that the Macedonian state is defined as a national state of the Macedonian people, throwing out of the article stating all minorities in Macedonia and the term "nationalities" (they ironically called it "the great invention of the Academy of Arts and Science") and using the term "national minorities", instead. But, the committee rejected this, as well as the biggest part of all other amendments proposed by VMRO-DPMNE. With the exception of the one on Article 7, dealing with the language. It states that the Macedonian will remain an official language and the Cyrillic an official alphabet, and the second part (stating separate laws will determine the way of usage of the Macedonian language) was erased from the constitution. As insistence on pure national constitution failed, the members of the party's parliamentary group left the 25th parliament session. Only few days afterwards, a protest march was organised in front of the parliament building, which even ended with breaking into the national television building. VMRO-DPMNE never formally took on the responsibility for these demonstrations and described it as a spontaneous revolt by the Macedonian people. Nevertheless, all this gave birth to rumours the party did not want to see the constitution adopted and the state completed.
The actual going into opposition by VMRO-DPMNE happened during the third extension of the 27th parliament session, when Parliament accepted the submitted resignations of Georgievski and Dragi Arsov, previous vice-president in the Parliament. These moves, along with the party's inability to constitute a govt cabinet after the fall of the so-called expert one, are the biggest party's minuses. Missing a sequence of opportunities to take a part of the govt cake, or at least getting close to the govt, seemed to raise a general doubt in whether the unyielding firm determination is the right formula for success. VMRO-DPMNE repeatedly insists on its disassociating from the current govt, which does not suit the party's moral criteria. But, the logic of the political struggle differs from one multiparty system to another, and points out the fact that such moves proved to be huge steps backwards in the case of VMRO-DPMNE.
Among the 15 political parties, which emerged at the pre- election times of the 90's, VMRO-DPMNE considerably stood out by its approach to priorities to be "taken into hands" once the elections were over. The party placed the accent on "completion of Macedonia's statehood, and especially on the care for Macedonians living in illegally annexed parts by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania, as well as for all minorities and ethnic groups living on the Macedonian territory." VMRO-DPMNE promoted a new attitude towards the Macedonian Diaspora -- political and economic immigrants should, as the party leader said in his campaign, be looked upon not as enemies and foreigners, but as an integral part of the Macedonian people living in this state. Quite opposed to the official policy of putting ethnic relations above all, in order to preserve an inner peace and resolve all possible dangers in a friendly atmosphere, Georgievski stressed a need of introducing sharp measures, which might seem hard to face at the beginning, but were bound to prove a good investment in the future. On one occasion, he said the main issue was, in fact, the question of about 100-150,000 Albanians from Kosovo settled in Macedonia, asking why a small state like Macedonia should bear such a big burden. He insisted Albanians could be granted only civil rights, but by no means could they become citizens of Macedonia.
Besides this obvious anti-Albanian point of view, the party also had an apparent hostile attitude towards the neighbouring states. Bulgaria seemed to be least attacked, which raised suspicions of the party's pro-Bulgarian orientation. The Bulgarian thesis of recognising the state, but not the people in Macedonia already being known, the visit paid to Bulgaria by the party, in February 1992, caused bitter public reactions and accusations of VMRO-DPMNE establishing too close relations with the Republic of Bulgaria. Georgievski poured an additional gasoline in the fire upon his return, stating "no politician or party official had not denied the existence of the Macedonian people, not even with a single insinuation," claiming all that had been a provocation by VMRO-SMD.
Perhaps because of its efforts to present itself as a party with an equal treatment for all neighbours, VMRO-DPMNE attempted to introduce confusion in the relations with Serbia, as well. As the party had chosen no means to attack the northern neighbour for its expansionist politics, the meeting with a delegation of the Serbian opposition party, led by Milan Paroski, in December that year, came as a big surprise. Their joint statement claimed there was no scenario in Serbia to attack Macedonia. Unfortunately, all this was too shallow to result in any serious conclusions, even more so because the party tried later on to present this meeting as a proof against all arguments of the neocommunist govt and the "independent " media on the "pro-Bulgarian" character of VMRO-DPMNE.
The party is also characterised with continuous inner differences and scandals. Its sympathisers, membership and voters are no doubt big in numbers, but VMRO-DPMNE never allowed itself the luxury of "democracy" in giving public statements, regardless of the kind of questions. The party basic points of view could simply be spoken on only by the top- leaders, preserving a hierarchy and continually consulting each other. Having in mind the uncontrolled out-of-the-line statements at Parliament by some of their deputies, this party policy is quite understandable. Regardless of the seriousness and effort with which certain party moves were prepared, it was all too easily destroyed with such statements, and all this could end in losing members, votes, and parliament deputies. Still, the party's political inexperience was most strongly manifested in the discrepancy between what the party wrote down and submitted as a request, and the always too much prolonged and unprecise debates on the same issues which followed afterwards. An euphoric behaviour became a synonym for the way they acted in. VMRO-DPMNE simply could not be consistently clear in its attitudes till the end, as all its good moves begun wisely ended in an incomprehensible weak finish. The party seemed to waste all its strongest attitudes at the beginning, and its political opponents were very skilful in making advantage of this fact. Thus, everything turned out in the end as mere threats with empty sheets of paper, and claims the revealing facts are kept for another and more convenient occasion.
A very significant feature, which will probably always be characteristic of this party, is its opposing govt points of view on all essential issues. The party disagreed with the constitution, insisting on adopting something like a transformational constitutive act. Not only was the constitution adopted, but the nation previously decided , on a referendum this party also opposed, for an independent and sovereign state, with a right to enter an association with the other former republics of Yugoslavia. On this issue, the party got totally controversial. It had insisted on an independent state, with a program orientation of future entering into some sort of a Balkan confederation, and now, when the referendum was to take place, it rejected the very same idea of a possible future confederation, instead of logically supporting it. The split with the then party secretary general Vladimir Golubovski, however much it did stir the public, was nothing as compared with the party's affair with Dragan Bogdanovski. The clash took place on a foreign territory -- during their joint visit to Canada, in October and November 1991, and the Macedonian public found out about this when it had been all over. Yet, the party scandals seem to have a up going chart line. Although not an inner party problem, VMRO-DPMNE dispute with the police, on several occasions ("Blue Bird", "Den", Gjorce Petrov, "Veles Bombardiers" and several smaller affairs), left space for the future generations not to do anything, and for the dispute still to be there. The only positive result of all this was opening up issues previously considered to be taboos. For instance, rehabilitation of individuals oppressed for ideas for independent Macedonia, requests for opening up of dossiers on citizens, instead of their being destroyed, freely speaking of the way in which the police defends the state and citizens... How all this will affect the party at the coming elections, remains to be yet seen.
Still, regardless of all failures and, as some say, all retroactive moves this party had tried to undertake, but was duly prevented by govt, it remains as a fact that VMRO-DPMNE has all features of an extraordinary interesting political subject, which does not lack invention, has been continually active, and still equally succeeds in drawing a great deal of attention onto itself. The fields in which it is more significantly weak (e.g., economy), the party covers up with hyperactivity in politics. At no time has it neglected the Diaspora and its international dimension. What it perhaps must learn is the ability to admit its mistakes. The theory "to say everything, and even too much, just so that the essential is comprehended" is just not always a good one. Anyhow, without VMRO-DPMNE, the Macedonian political scene would have been out of balance, although it will apparently take much longer time before Macedonia has a true opposition with serious chances for winning power.